Risky Lottery

Find the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium mixed strategy for a lottery where the winner is the player holding the smallest number written exactly once, and print each pick probability to five decimals.

Hard9Game theoryProbabilityMathBrute forceNo attempts yetTime limit2sMemory limit512 MB

Problem

Prof. Peter runs a lottery for his class with an unusual rule. He first announces a small positive integer MM. Each of the NN students then secretly writes one integer from 11 to MM on a slip of paper and folds the slip. After everyone has chosen, all slips are opened at once. Among the numbers that exactly one student wrote, the student who wrote the smallest one wins. If no number was written by exactly one student, there is no winner.

For example, with three students, if two of them write 22 and the third writes 55, then the student who wrote 55 wins.

Now suppose every student follows the same randomized strategy, so each student picks number kk with probability pkp_k. The strategy is optimal if, when everyone follows it, no single student can raise his own winning probability by switching to a different strategy.

Given NN and MM, find the optimal strategy, that is, the probability of picking each number from 11 to MM. The optimal strategy is unique in the given range.

Input

One line with two integers NN and MM, separated by a space. NN is the number of students in the class and MM is the largest integer a student can pick.

Output

Print MM lines. Line kk holds the probability of picking number kk, rounded to five decimal places.

Constraints

  • 3N73 \le N \le 7, the number of students in the class
  • 1MN+11 \le M \le N+1, the largest integer that can be picked